

# Venture

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## Comment

### A SOCIALIST VICTORY

‘ONCE in a long while in the history of a people,’ said Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, the first Prime Minister of Singapore, ‘there comes a moment of great change. The new constitution is not what we really want. It is but a step forward towards merger with the Federation of Malaya and *merdeka*.’ Even so, the victory rally, at which he was speaking, marked a significant break with the past.

The election was well conducted without any of the incidents that had marred previous elections. The electoral roll was 590,000, of which 324,000 were newly-registered citizens; voting was compulsory, the overall voting percentage was 89.4; 54 per cent. went to the People’s Action Party who won 43 of the 51 seats. Of the remaining eight seats, the Singapore People’s Alliance won four. Mr. Lim Yew Hock, the former Chief Minister, was returned; the United Malay National Organisation won three, including Dato Abdul Hamid bin Haji Jumat, the previous Minister of Local Government, and there was one Independent.

The P.A.P. won a conclusive victory because it was highly organised and its anti-colonial non-communist programme, of which nearly 100,000 copies were sold, mostly in Chinese, appealed to the mass of the people. The right-wing parties split their vote by failing to agree as to the number of seats each would surrender in order to form a united front against the P.A.P. Had they succeeded in reaching agreement, the P.A.P. would still have had a clear majority.

Mr. Lee Kuan Yew during the election campaign firmly stated that if the P.A.P. won, he would refuse to form a government unless eight detainees, prominent members of the P.A.P. who were arrested after the riots in 1956, were released. The new government is responsible for internal security (subject to the functions of the Internal

Security Council) and the Governor was wise to order their release and give Mr. Lee a chance to do the job in his own way.

The Prime Minister, recognising the all-important task of building good relations with the Federation of Malaya, lost no time in arranging talks with Dato Abdul Razak. He and his Ministers left on the Queen’s birthday, provoking press comment, which fails to recognise that parades and garden parties are identified with colonial life.

A statement issued after the meeting emphasised that all the Ministers ‘were firmly agreed that under no circumstances would they countenance any attempts to arouse racial or communal friction’. Agreement was also reached on the setting up of the Internal Security Council and Mr. Lee was assured that the Federation representative would always view the problems of the Singapore Government with the greatest sympathy. So far so good.

#### Far-reaching Programme

The new government faces a challenge from the right and the left. Chinese capitalists and Europeans are dismayed, and communist policy, now that the P.A.P. is no longer in Opposition, is anyone’s guess.

The five-year plan forecasts immense changes:

1. Development of industries to bring about a change from a trading to a productive economy. For this purpose there is to be an economic development board.

2. The city council to be scrapped, leaving only a public utilities board for water, electricity and gas.

3. More training of the people in technical skills.

4. School instruction to have a more Asian emphasis and more concentration on ‘subjects



that have a direct bearing on our lives to-day.' The traditional concept, says the party, that education is the means for acquiring a white-collar job, must go overboard.

5. A unified trade union movement and an independent labour court for industrial disputes.

6. Decentralisation of hospitals and health services, with one class of wards for all.

7. Development of agriculture and fisheries.

8. Emancipation of women, beginning with a monogamous marriage law which, however, will not be allowed to conflict with religious beliefs.

In the short time since Mr. Lee took over a number of moves have been made. The City Council has already been wound up and its powers transferred to the Minister for National Development. Permits for the publication of eight 'glossies' have been withdrawn and the licence of a Chinese leg show cancelled; the moral standards of the younger generation have been vigorously attacked, their decline is attributed to colonialism; a unified Malayan culture is to be energetically fostered. The threat during the election campaign to foreign-owned newspapers who disrupt good relations between the Federation and Singapore has roused the *Straits Times* editor to protest at the conference of the Commonwealth Press Union and the International Press Institute has sent an observer to Singapore. The Ministry of Home Affairs has refused permission to members of the Legislative Assembly for the holding of meetings to celebrate victory ('it is time for work') and Ministers' salaries have been reduced. Straws in the wind so far, but evidence of a party dedicated to wipe out the colonial past, to campaign for social reform. Not all the measures will be understood or approved by socialists in this country. The leadership in Asia and Africa, whether nationalist or socialist, must work out their own methods of achieving the ends we hold in common.

## CRISIS IN UGANDA

BY proscribing the Uganda National Movement and arresting its leaders the government of Uganda has provoked a major political crisis. Arbitrary 'police' action of this type can never really solve colonial problems, but a crisis, even if artificially induced, may have the limited advantage of bringing the Protectorate Government back to a sense of reality. Since the departure of Sir Andrew Cohen, policy making at Entebbe, conducted under the maxim 'let sleeping dogs lie', has been characterised by a mixture of indolence and appeasement. So long as dissension between nationalist and traditionalist elements in Buganda immobilised the political life of the whole Protectorate, Sir Frederick Crawford's

lethargic methods were superficially successful. Now there is a reckoning, and difficult constitutional problems must be dealt with against a background of recrimination and violence.

The U.N.M. (now succeeded by the Freedom Convention) has not of course brought unity even inside Buganda. The most it can be said to have achieved is a working compromise between a number of hitherto dissident factions. That it is why it is so difficult to say what it stands for. A bewildering number of different explanations has appeared in the English press and reports from Uganda are not much clearer. The truth is that there is no way of plotting the precise political position of a movement comprised of such diverse elements. Its leadership ranges all the way from semi-educated tribalists like Augustine Kamyia and Haji Busungu to sophisticated Western-style politicians like E. M. K. Mulira and Ignatius Musazi. This diversity seems to have been in itself a source of strength. These men cannot be put out of action in Buganda by being dubbed 'enemies of the Kabaka' like the leaders of the National Congress. On the other hand they cannot be manipulated from Mengo. The failure of the Katikiro to put a stop to the trade boycott is the most serious blow to the authority of the Kabaka's government since the return of Mutesa in 1955.

Policy statements from the new movement even before the arrest of its leaders were short and obscure. On the credit side they gave no encouragement to Buganda separatism, the necessity for a central government being acknowledged in at least two separate statements. On the other hand the Legislative Council and the Constitutional Committee were both denounced, although the effect of this was somewhat qualified by the demand for a 'genuine democratic national assembly representing all the people of Uganda' to replace the present Legco. The Movement apparently favoured the idea of a delegate conference drawn from, or elected by, the Lukiko and the other African local authorities to replace the Constitutional Committee. These bits and pieces do not amount to a coherent policy. They do, however, reflect a concern with the two basic constitutional issues facing the country. These are the status and composition of the Legislative Council on the one hand and the relationship between the Legislative Council and the traditional African authorities on the other.

It is only the first of these issues that falls within the terms of reference of the Constitutional Committee. This is perhaps fortunate as the work of this Committee has been hopelessly prejudiced by the bad start given to it by the Government. It was an absurd mistake to appoint a civil servant



as chairman and even worse to give it terms of reference so obscure as to be positively misleading. The terms of reference are defective in two ways, (a) they almost manage to conceal the fact that it is open to the Committee to recommend a majority of African-elected members, in other words, self-government. This of course should have been proclaimed with trumpets. (b) They give the misleading impression that the government is committed to special representation for the Asians and Europeans.

The other issue, the relationship between Legco and the traditional African authorities is not recognised by the government to be a problem at all except in the case of Buganda. Separate discussions about this with Baganda alone have been proposed by the Secretary of State. Such discussions are resented by the rest of the Protectorate and can only serve to enhance the special status of Buganda. The issue is one which obviously affects the Protectorate as a whole, and however difficult, should be faced squarely on that basis.

## C.D.C. AND GOVERNMENT

THE 1958 Annual Report of the Colonial Development Corporation reveals, in the pungent phrases of its Chairman, the same lukewarm attitude on the part of the Government towards colonial development as was demonstrated in the recent debates on the 1959 C.D. and W. Act. Not only has Lord Reith been compelled to repeat his previous strictures concerning the burden of bad debts from the Corporation's early days, and the unpredictable nature of interest rates imposed by the Government on moneys loaned to the Corporation. He also protests in the strongest language against increasing interference and obstruction from Whitehall. The Government's insistence, contrary to the original spirit in which the C.D.C. was created, on the right of the Colonial Office to 'vet' all new projects in detail has led to very serious delays. Out of 132 new schemes before the Corporation in the last two years, ten were actually started in 1957 and only five in 1958. Moreover, it is implicit in the Report that part at least of this interference has been designed to make sure that some of the more attractive projects should be diverted into the hands of private enterprise. This, of course, is strictly in accordance with the Government's avowed policy in regard to Exchequer loans under the new C.D. and W. Act.

The grievance over interest rates still remains. As Mr. Harold Wilson has clearly pointed out elsewhere, despite a fall in bank rate to 4 per cent., and the Government's own borrowing rate on Treasury bills of 3.3 per cent., the Corporation is still having to pay 5½ per cent., a rate far too

high for the sort of project it is expected to undertake. The debt burden of £8m., which dates from the failures of the early days, although now shown in a special account still hampers the continuing projects of to-day. It is possible that the review of the Corporation's capital structure now being undertaken may lead, as we have long advocated, to its being written off. But this apart, it is clear that a radical revision of official attitudes will have to be undertaken if the Corporation is to flourish as a healthy organ of development.

## THE STATE ELECTIONS

A MOST encouraging aspect of the recent State elections in Malaya is the number of parties opposing the Alliance which represents the United Malay Nationalist Organisation, the Malayan Chinese Association and the Malayan Indian Congress. In 1955 most of the seats were uncontested. Now in every state parties to the right and the left of the Alliance have put up candidates. The People's Progressive Party, the Socialist Front, the Pan Malayan Islamic Party, the Negara, have all entered the field although the gains have been small. The Pan Malayan Islamic Party, which won the election in Trengannu, represents the most serious threat to racial harmony in the Federation. It is dedicated to creating a theocratic state based on the tenets of the Hadith and the Koran. The leaders of U.M.N.O. maintain that the practical application of such a state would result in bloodshed and chaos in multi-racial Malaya.

The left-wing parties, the People's Progressive Party, the Socialist Front (a joint organisation of the Labour Party and the Parti Rakyat or People's Party) are mainly parties of young people. They have been handicapped by the Election Offences (Amendment) Ordinance, which amongst other regulations forbids any person who is not a Federal citizen over 21 from taking part in election activities. Another action which has weakened the Socialist Front is the arrest of many leading members of the Party for alleged subversive activities.

In the two years of independence the Government has struggled to bring an end to the emergency, and 80 per cent. of the country is 'white'; it now fears communist infiltration of democratic organisations. The overwhelming need is to maintain racial harmony and only the Alliance Party has the authority to keep the peace between the races. It is to be hoped that a time will come when the Socialist Front has built up an inter-racial organisation strong enough to challenge the conservative parties. The State elections suggest a complete victory for the Government in the Federal elections in August.



# THE SHOOTING AT NKATA BAY

## An Eyewitness Account

ON March 3rd twenty Africans were shot by a sergeant and four soldiers at Nkata Bay while attempting to rescue members of the Nyasaland African Congress who had been detained when the state of emergency was declared, and who were at the time in a motor vessel lying at a jetty in the bay. At the inquest a verdict of 'justifiable homicide' was returned. Mr. Julian Amery (Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies) said in the House of Commons that when the crowd reached the dock gate and it became evident that they had no intention of dispersing the District Commissioner read out the Riot Act but without effect and that it was only after the crowd had broken into the port area that firearms were used. We print below an eye-witness account<sup>1</sup> of the incident sent to us by an African who is an officer of the Congress Liberation Party<sup>2</sup> and a member of the Bureau:

'The very tragic incident at Nkata Bay has its own significance in relation to the general trends of the disturbances. The atmosphere in Nkata Bay was quite calm, no pennyworth of anything was damaged before or after the State of Emergency. According to my common sense this was so because Nkata Bay District is dominated by the Congress Liberation Party which advocates non-violence, and these people who came to the Bay carried no kind of weapon.

### Agreement to go Unarmed

On Tuesday, March 3rd, some Nyasaland African Congress leaders were arrested. One leader was not arrested. This leader went round the villages very early in the morning after the emergency had been declared. He told people to stop their daily business and to go to Nkata Bay and ask why their leaders had been arrested. This leader told them that the leaders had been arrested because the government wanted to impose Federation with force. He went along telling people that the government had even sent soldiers to force people into unwanted Federation. This call on people who are strongly opposed to Federation was very effective. Many people flocked to Nkata Bay, including school children. Before they went to Nkata Bay they assembled at one place, and advised each other not to carry any weapon, and so they did not carry anything up to the Bay.

At the Bay they first went to the prison where they found police and riot squads. While at the prison they demanded the release of their leaders who had been arrested in the small hours of the

morning of the 3rd March. Afterwards the District Commissioner came and he tried in vain to disperse the mob. The District Commissioner told them that the detained leaders were not in the prison, but had been transferred into a ferry-boat. And furthermore the District Commissioner told the crowd that he had no power to release the detained leaders; he said that this could only be done on the advice of the Governor. But all in vain; people wanted their release. After they had dispersed from the prison they all went in a crowd to the post office where there were some security forces, and they told the District Commissioner to telephone to the Provincial Commissioner that people needed the release of their detained leaders. They did not stay long here.

During this time the unarrested leader had gone to call some people from a distance where he was arrested by the Chombe Estate Manager. All this time people were being led by some self-appointed leaders. All along from the prison to the post office and then to the jetty the District Commissioner was there trying to disperse the mob.

While at the jetty the mob was tense and was shouting all sorts of slogans and the District Commissioner read the Riot Act, which I am sure was not known to the people for it was the first time in the history of the country that there had been such an unruly mob. The Riot Act was read twice. Amid all this, people did not intend damaging anything at all. The crowd was told that a State of Emergency had been declared in the country. Unfortunately not one among the masses knew the significance of a State of Emergency, and what it implied. In fact many people did not know what was happening and they could not hear each other. These people for a long time asked the District Commissioner to release their leaders, who they thought were arrested because the Government wanted to impose Federation with force.

While waiting and doing no harm to anyone or doing any sort of damage, but demanding the release of their leaders, shots were fired and 15 people died instantly at the spot, including three women, two of whom were pregnant. All told 20 people died in this sad incident.'

### Correction

A correspondent points out an error in the article in last month's issue, 'Why Congress Was Banned' by Joshua Nkomo. African trade unions did exist in Southern Rhodesia but they could not participate in the conciliation machinery and they had no legal status. In January, 1960, a new Bill comes into force which permits Africans to join the existing trade unions and for the first time brings them into the framework of Southern Rhodesian industrial legislation. This Bill forbids the use of union funds for political purposes and includes provisions for a compulsory secret ballot before a union can resort to strike action.

<sup>1</sup> Which also appeared in a letter from the Bureau in the *Manchester Guardian* of June 15th.

<sup>2</sup> The Congress Liberation Party was formed last year by a group which broke away from the Nyasaland African Congress following disagreements on leadership. It has the same policy aims as the Nyasaland African Congress but has not been banned.



## CHALLENGE TO SALISBURY

**THE** following comments on the article 'Central African Federation—An Estimate of the Financial Effects', by T. F. Betts (May), were made by Mr. Donald MacIntyre, the Minister of Finance during a press conference. The extracts we print are taken from the Federation Newsletter dated May 15th.

**S**AYING, 'these Fabians give me a pain in the neck', Mr. Donald MacIntyre gave the following answers to the points raised:

(a) The Fabians would give high priority to Nyasaland development and the Shire Irrigation Scheme.—The Federal Government had already spent some £100,000 on the Shire project for investigations and preliminary development. It had to be established whether the project was justified. If it was then it would be carried out by outside finance, such as the World Bank.

(b) In 1953 Southern Rhodesia saved herself from a desperate situation by unloading £87,000,000 of her public debt (much of it incurred in loans to European farmers) on the Federation.—Only £5,000,000 of this total was loans to farming. The rest of the money was for general development in Southern Rhodesia and included £32,000,000 to the Rhodesia Railways, which served both Rhodesias. At federation, Southern Rhodesia handed over assets to the value of the £87,000,000 loans. These assets to the value of the £87,000,000 loans. These included such things as railways, hospitals and schools.

(c) The Kariba scheme benefited only the two Rhodesias.—Correct. But Nyasaland had been compensated by an interest-free loan of £1,000,000.

(d) Nyasaland had received no more in development loans than she could have expected from increases in her own revenues and grants from Colonial Development and Welfare funds.—Before federation, Nyasaland's loans were only £2,000,000 from outside lenders. In the first four years of federation she had received £2.4m. plus £5.4m. of the Federal Government's loan votes. She could still get loans from the Colonial Development and Welfare Funds through the Colonial Office.

(e) Northern Rhodesia had underwritten the whole economy of the Federation.—This might have been true in 1953 and when the price of copper was around the £400-a-ton mark. But it was not true now and Southern Rhodesia was to-day the biggest contributor to federal income even at the present copper price of around £235 a ton. (R.H. 7.5.59.)

### Mr. Betts Replies :

I am sorry to have given Mr. Donald MacIntyre so much physical discomfort, but the embrocation of hard facts though a little painful at first may provide an eventual cure.

The article on which he comments is the result of straightforward analysis of data made available in the Apportionment Commission Report and the printed Estimates for the Federation. Practically all the figures given in the article are derived from these sources, and I still believe that the conclusions drawn from them are inescapable. The fact that the article is to some extent conjectural is due to the paucity of the information, amounting almost to

deliberate obscurantism, in the Federal statistics provided for public consumption. The fact remains, moreover, that Mr. MacIntyre has not challenged in any detail the main body of my paper, particularly that dealing with current revenues.

Taking the points raised by Mr. MacIntyre, it can be said straightaway that his rebuttals are either evasive or inaccurate, containing much of that double talk of which Federal spokesmen are all so fond.

In Point (a) he says that Fabians will give high priority to the Shire Irrigation Scheme whereas the only reference to this in my article was to the fact it had again been shelved for lack of funds. But in any case Mr. MacIntyre states that it will have to be provided for by outside finance such as the World Bank, and clearly the heavy sums already loaned for the Kariba Scheme and other developments in Rhodesia are likely to prejudice the success of any such application.

As for Point (b) he states that only £5 millions of the transferred public debt of Southern Rhodesia were loans to farming. In fact, of course, at least £8 millions represented debts of the farming side of the Land and Agricultural Bank and the Agricultural Statutory Boards, while there were other considerable but unitemised charges for the assets of the Agricultural Department which were unique to Southern Rhodesia. His statement that assets to the value of the whole of the £87 millions were transferred from S. Rhodesia to the Federation is again inaccurate as it was specifically stated that after the assets had been valued at round £85 millions a further £2 millions of Southern Rhodesia's debt was transferred for reasons of viability. He contends, moreover, that by far the greater part of the debt transferred had been incurred on 'general development', but he does not refer to my point that this included the high cost of the European immigration programme although he has stressed this in more than one of his budget speeches. Moreover, how does he get round the Commission's statement that one of the main reasons for the very high figure of transferred public debt was the transfer of responsibility for the Agricultural Statutory Commissions?

In his Point (c) he claims that Nyasaland received a free loan of £1 million as compensation for the large expenditure on Kariba, but to what loan is he referring? If this is the one from the Rhodesian Selection Trust, how can the Federal Government claim credit for this?

His Point (d). Perhaps Mr. MacIntyre could clear up a point of obscurity here. If before Federation Nyasaland's loans from outside were only £2 millions, how did she acquire a debt of £6 millions by 1953? He states, moreover, that in the first four

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# BRITAIN AND ARAB N

A YOUNG student friend of mine in Damascus asked me this spring why Britain, in favour of Commonwealth unity, Atlantic unity and European unity, should be opposed to Arab unity? In reply I could not in truth tell him that more than a small minority of British people are sympathetic with Arab nationalism. Neither are most British people anxious to see set up a united Arab community stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean. It might be possible to understand Conservative opposition to self-determination and power groupings outside British control. But it was in Damascus disappointing to have to admit this shortcoming on the part of the Labour Party. As a result of Britain's opposition to the main tide of Arab feeling, London to-day continues largely discredited just when the mistakes of Moscow and Washington could have meant the Arabs looking on the British as their leading friends in the outside world.

## Lack of Effort

Of course Britain lost her chance not so much in 1959 as in 1919. Britain never really got started in winning the sympathy of the Arabs.

The British armies in World War I drove the Turks out of the Middle East only to replace the Ottoman Empire by a system which, to most Arabs, was almost as obnoxious. Britain in allowing France to move into Syria humiliated the Arab people. Britain in promising a national home for the Jews started on a path which in Arab eyes, at any rate, was to continue as a standing affront right up to the present day. Finally, the British Government of the time made sure that it gained the sympathy of neither the commercial groups nor the younger generation by pinning its faith on a group of Arab princelings who, whatever their personal merits, had no contact with the people and were unlikely to flourish when transplanted at will by the whims of Whitehall. Indeed, the way Britain started its major period of power in the Middle East in 1919 seemed almost to show that it never believed in any permanent association with the Arabs. Certainly there was not that effort in administration or in the field of education and justice that Britain put into territories such as India or Malaya. Absolute power enjoyed by Whitehall was not used to wipe out the abuses of the Turkish Empire and build afresh. It was merely employed to perpetuate a policy of drift.

Now forty years after many people in Britain and elsewhere are prepared to write the Arab world off as a bad job. Some say British power has declined so much that it is not worth trying to maintain a relationship with the Arab people. Others, either Zionists or diehards, proclaim that the Arab peoples are not worthy of British friendship!

Yet in 1959 Britain is still the largest trader in the Middle East. Britain depends on the Arab world for oil to keep its economy functioning. British communications with Asia and Australasia are in-

separably bound up with the Middle East that lies in between. So instead of a negative abdication of interest to-day, the British people might well do some hard thinking about how friendship with the Arab peoples can be built up and maintained.

To begin with any success in this field will not, of course, be achieved by the game of playing one Arab nation off against another. In the last two months certain sections of British opinion congenitally opposed to President Nasser have seemed prepared almost to welcome a communist Iraq provided Colonel Nasser is thwarted there. A small minority in Britain, who have a guilt complex over Colonel Nasser, go in the other direction. They appear unwilling to admit that other figures in the Arab world, such as President Bourguiba, have any right to speak for or represent any part of the Middle East.

Before Britain is able to secure her relationships with the Arab people on a new firm footing, a simple truth should be recognised. The Arab people can establish a working political arrangement for the Middle East only through their own efforts. And in reaching for this goal they must make mistakes by themselves. The Arab people are supreme individualists. Co-operation does not come easily to them. The machinery for ordered unity is only elementary throughout the Arab nations and undoubtedly personal ambitions in Cairo and Baghdad, for example, must upset the time-table towards the full satisfaction of Arab nationalism. But any attempt by Britain or America to try to shape from outside the eventual pattern of Arab unity can only lead to disaster internally and abuse directed at the outside adviser. And an incidental result of suspected Western interference is always a better chance for the communist destruction of Arab freedom.

## A New Attitude Needed

British policy towards the Arab nations should admit firmly and finally a willingness to give up personal interference in the affairs of Arab states. This must be linked with the recognition that the Sheikdoms in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere in the Arab world, at present controlled by Britain, must in time pass from the control of London. A British policy that encourages this to happen peacefully in accordance with the geographical requirements of the area may be distasteful to some of the remaining ruling elements, but it will win friends for Britain in the independent Arab world.

Then Britain does not have to be always the personal apologist for Israel in the Middle East. The protection of Israel's frontiers is a responsibility not of London, but of the United Nations. The settlement of quarrels between Arabs and Jews is primarily a matter of local concern. And if the peace of the world is threatened again, it is the United Nations and not Britain or any other nation who should intervene to settle the quarrels.



But the main basis of British partnership with Arab nationalism should not, of course, be based on a divorce of power in the Persian Gulf or a clear separation of London from the ambitions of Israel.

To begin with a much more imaginative use of oil interests in the Middle East should be urged by Britain. In fifty years time there is no doubt that the oil wells of the Arab world will not be controlled by Western powers, but by the nations themselves. The most sensible solution would be a gradual transfer of ownership. This can be achieved by a staged increase of payment of oil royalties. At the same time it can be helped by a speed up in the policy of training Arab technicians and management. Britain gained the friendship of the Indian people by recognising the inevitability of independence and acting ahead of it. In the same way in the Middle East, Britain can gain Arab friendship, increase Arab wealth and help towards the stability of the area by taking the initiative in increasing the Arab share of oil revenues.

## **A Positive Economic Policy**

Emile Bustani, a distinguished Arab industrialist and politician, has outlined a plan along these lines that envisages the annual deduction of 10 per cent. from the gross proceeds of oil produced in the Middle East.

Even with present production figures such an allocation would produce a revenue of seventy million pounds a year. And at the present rate of increase in oil output, this total could in all probability be doubled by 1965.

Of course it may be that British along with other oil interests would be unwilling to back such a scheme. Yet the present great inequality of income in the region, which results in enormous wealth in Kuwait alongside abysmal poverty in Jordan cannot in the long run be of benefit to Britain or to Kuwait itself; because communism thrives on poverty just as progressive social and economic systems can be made possible by sound financial backing.

Britain and other Western nations possess, through their oil revenues, an instrument for promoting friendship within the Arab world which, for all Russia's efforts, Moscow can never equal. At the moment, however, in the eyes of many of the rising generation of Arab leaders it seems that Britain and her Western allies have a primarily negative economic viewpoint concerning the use of oil revenues.

One practical measure of policy that immediately recommends itself is the support of the idea for an Arab Development Bank. This, financed by a ten per cent. share of oil revenues, could be used for projects aimed to benefit all the Arab world and not just the oil producing countries. It would mean not merely speeches about Arab unity. It would mean a detailed co-operation on new roads, new hospitals and new schools by the Arab peoples. The Arabs would be required in the process to involve themselves in the essential if boring matters of practical day-to-day co-operation.

Then again Britain can help towards Arab unity and encourage her friendship with the Arab people by a greatly increased exchange in the field of education. To-day over a thousand Iraqi students study in Britain. In Britain they meet Arab students from Tunisia, Jordan and Morocco. The British Embassies throughout the Middle East to-day would ensure British prestige in the area more by encouraging local scholarship projects than by studying intelligence reports concerning the weaknesses of Arab political leaders.

At the same time a much wider knowledge of the Arab world, its history and its culture is needed in the United Kingdom. Britain need not apologise for its past records in the study of Arab culture. But there is a danger that this study will atrophy. The number of Arab students studying Arabic to-day at British universities is far too small, even from the practical point of view of increased business needs. But also there is a great need for a knowledge of modern colloquial Arab thought and literature. An ability to speak classical Arabic may be admirable. But the speaker will be unintelligible in every-day conversation in Baghdad, Cairo or Rabat.

When I was in Cairo this spring, an Arabic friend asked me, why is it that the Royal Ballet or the Old Vic could always visit America or Australia, and never seemed to be able to come to the capitals of the Middle East? This question highlights the cultural neglect of the Arab world by Britain. A visit by the Old Vic to the Baalbeck Festival two years ago, was a resounding success. Closer friendship and understanding between Britain and the Arab world could certainly result if London was prepared to send its finest artists to perform for the Arab people in the way that the Soviet Union has done in despatching their theatrical groups to the area.

## **Recognition of a Just Cause**

But the greatest need on the part of Britain in order to improve relations with the Arab world is the simplest. It is merely a much wider recognition on the part of politicians and the general public in the United Kingdom of the validity and justice of the Arab nationalist cause. If the Arab people were convinced that Britain sympathised with them in their desire for unity, then individual mistakes in British policy could be forgiven. At the moment, however, most of the rising generation of Arab leaders believe that Britain is still opposed to the Arab people getting together and creating a united Arab nation from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean. With this belief Britain's individual successes in dealing with Arab countries tend to be ignored, simply because of the Arab feeling that the United Kingdom is fundamentally out of sympathy with their cause. The task for Britain to-day is clearly to accord the same friendship and understanding for Nationalist aspirations within the Arab world that Britain gives to such hopes throughout all Commonwealth territories.



# NIGERIA'S UNIVERSITY

By BRIAN STAPLETON

A VERY lucky choice was made when in 1947 Dr. Kenneth Mellanby was appointed as the creator and first Principal of the University College, Ibadan; perhaps, also, it was good that he left in 1953. When Dr. Saunders took over, the name of Mellanby was not universally revered and there was an administrative mess to clear up. Had a Principal with less energy and drive been appointed there might have been—nothing. Reading the story,<sup>1</sup> which is admittedly one man's view, and discussing with those who were there at the time, one is continually impressed by the vigour with which a working university was created out of slender means and the vague and often contradictory ideas of so many people.

The rapid changes in social and political attitudes and actualities are easily forgotten. It is true that Dr. Mellanby is criticised by Nigerians to-day for tying the University too closely to English academic traditions, but if he had not done so in the early years he would not have got support from the authorities holding the purse-strings and much informed Nigerian opinion would also have been against him. It is useful, if easy, to suggest now in 1959 when there is a well-established University College and independence is almost here, that the balance of development should lean towards the inclusion of more courses related to West Africa and Nigeria; to have pressed for this ten years ago would have met official opposition and been called 'second-class education' by Nigerians. As local research proceeds and the Nigerian proportion of the academic staff increases, so a true Nigerian University will emerge, a university fathered by London, a university of world-wide repute.

## Staff and Students

Perhaps the most striking gap in the courses provided has been the almost total omission, until very recently, of the social sciences. This is difficult to understand to-day when Ibadan has topped 1,000 students and another university may very soon appear in the Eastern Region. The explanation lies in the fact that the original plan by the Elliott Commission was that the University Colleges of Ghana and Nigeria should be complementary and that 'expensive departments and faculties would not be duplicated'. Thus Ibadan was to provide the hospital and medical facilities whilst Ghana was to provide for the social sciences. This did not prove acceptable in the long run and the delay in the opening of the hospital in Ibadan has meant that no Ghanaian medical students have come over. The University College of Ghana has, on the other hand, had a student capacity beyond the number of qualified Ghanaians and a fair proportion of economics graduates there have been Nigerians. Originally

it was the expatriate view that Nigeria should not have a chair of economics; later, as part of a large supplementary budget for the College, a sum of £5,000 was asked for to establish one. This was the only item cut out by the Nigerian Council of Ministers. To-day, though, the department of economics is established and may soon become a full faculty, there is no separate department of law, philosophy, politics or sociology.

Whoever Dr. Mellanby antagonised, he did achieve good relationships with the student body; so much so that when he was leaving they said in their illuminated address, 'you understood the thought and feelings of the students and endeavoured assiduously to direct them into the right channels. . . . Incidentally, the two major cases of misunderstanding we have had with the College authorities in the last two years have occurred during your absence'. Since his day relationships have deteriorated culminating in the disturbances late in 1957 as a result of which the whole student body was sent down for some weeks, leaving an uneasy relationship to-day. This is not really due to a desire for Nigerianisation; Nigerian as well as European members of staff are out of touch with students, if sometimes for different reasons. Students and staff do not see much of each other outside lecturing hours, and despite continual discussion a full tutorial system does not operate. The Inter-University Council Visitation Report of 1957 states, ' . . . a system of moral tutors has recently been instituted; such a system is, in our opinion, valuable if it can be made fully operative'.

Much discussion has gone on as to the relative quality of Nigerian students compared with their fellows overseas. Do Nigerian students work harder? Dr. Mellanby says that they do not, and I incline to agree with him. Nigerian students are surely the intellectual equals of other students, but there is not yet enough understanding of the poverty of the tools with which the fresher arrives. His qualifying subjects may well have been passed by parrot-wise learning of Rapid Results notes; he may never have had the money to afford books or the shops in which to choose them. He is almost certainly a slow reader in his second language. The cultural life of the University is quite vigorous, but student societies are rarely in the lead. Political societies are not permitted.

Mr. Mellanby points out that the increase in the proportion of the staff who are Nigerians has been slow. The 1958-59 Calendar shows something over 20 per cent. as Nigerians. It was good to hear the students applauding the Prime Minister of the Federation when he said at the College recently, 'No Nigerianisation at the expense of academic standards'; nevertheless one tends to echo Thomas Hodgkin writing in *Ibadan* in October, 1958, 'An African University whose staff is 80 per cent. . . . European may well, through sheer ignorance, be insufficiently sensitive to national needs'.

<sup>1</sup> *The Birth of Nigeria's University* by Kenneth Mellanby (Methuen. 25s.)



# MALI AND THE COMMONWEALTH

WHO wins in West Africa—the British Commonwealth or the French Community? The intelligent president of the Mali Federation (composed of the newly self-governing but dependent republics of Soudan and Senegal), M. Modibo Keita, seems to think that one of them must—but that both cannot. There are—he remarked in Paris towards the end of May—two cold wars going on in West Africa: one between Russia and the West, and the other between the French Community and the British Commonwealth. The first, one may agree, certainly exists, at any rate in an economic sense: but what about the second?

The French have lately given many signs of thinking that Britain and the Commonwealth were as much a foe to their interests in West Africa as Russia—or the cause of African independence. When last year's premier of the Niger Territory, M. Djibo Bakary, campaigned for a 'No' to de Gaulle last autumn, he was bitterly accused from French official sources of 'selling out' to the British—who were said to be intriguing for the addition of the Niger Territory to Northern Nigeria. There is nothing to show that Britain was doing anything of the kind; but the French have remained hard to convince. And when Guinea declared her independence and Ghana came to Guinea's aid with a loan of sterling, the French Government and its press seemed absolutely sure that this was one more gambit by Albion, perfidious as ever.

This is enough to show that the illusion of conflict certainly exists. But the reality behind this, one may suspect, is very far to seek. The real conflict, so far as French-speaking Africa is concerned, is not between the Commonwealth and the community, but between the peoples of French-speaking Africa and the Government of France. (Would Guinea, for example, have needed a loan of sterling if France had not so abruptly and completely shut off credit when Guinea took de Gaulle at his word and declared for independence?) And M. Modibo Keita, one may think, was merely enjoying himself in a tactical manoeuvre aimed not at the Commonwealth—but at the notion that the *status quo* in French-speaking West Africa should now remain unchanged for a long time into the future.

The fact seems to be that M. Keita—like M. Dia in Senegal next door, and like most leading men in the Mali Federation—is trying to induce the French to see that they must prepare themselves, and accept further constitutional change and development. Senegal and Soudan are a natural enough unit (however little many conservative Frenchmen may like the emergence of Mali): but to fuse Mali with Guinea would now be even more natural. In all three territories the same two peoples (Mandingo and Foulah) are dominant or important, while the Sousou of Guinea (they number about one-third of Guinea's population) are also a remote branch of the same family as the Mandingo. Between Soudan and Upper Guinea there is no frontier that makes any kind of sense for a self-governing Africa.

What Senegal and Soudan would like, in short, is to persuade the French to accept a junction between Mali and Guinea—the three acquiring a unified status that would closely resemble the Dominion status of Ghana (or the present status of Guinea). This is why M. Keita—having pointed to the great potential power of Nigeria as an attractive force—said that after Nigeria became independent 'the links of the Community might not be enough, and so African unity was perhaps the best way of resisting' that attractive force. And this is why he said that French-speaking African states should group themselves in a federation of which Mali was only the first stage.

Ten years ago the French Union foundered in the miseries of a misbegotten colonial war in Indo-China. Will the Community prove more fortunate? Everything suggests that it will—but on one condition: that France now accepts the logic of what M. Keita and his friends are so tactfully saying. The British have learnt much from their experience with an independent Ghana (and we, of course, had already had the advantage of learning from our experience with an independent India). Will France learn as much—or at any rate *enough*—from its experience with an independent Guinea? This is the question M. Keita was really putting. This is the big question in all French-speaking Africa today.

Basil Davidson

## Challenge to Salisbury

(Continued from page 5)

years of Federation Nyasaland received £5.4 millions of Federal loans. It is unfortunate for him that the official Newsletter from which we have taken the statement, followed immediately with another news item which declared that the Federation has raised £163 millions in loans in the last five years.

On Point (e) Mr. Macintyre argues that with the fall in the price of copper, Southern Rhodesia has lately gone ahead of Northern Rhodesia in her contribution to the Federal revenue. This may well be so since the published statistics available do not cover the period of the copper price fall's effect.

But two points are clear: first, is it not a fact that over the whole period Northern Rhodesia has been by far the biggest contributor; and, second, such a statement has no meaning whatsoever unless also account is taken of the proportions and direction of Federal expenditure. I challenge Mr. Macintyre and the Federal Government to publish in preparation for the Constitutional Review, which may or may not take place in 1960, a White Paper giving all the material facts in the fullest detail, itemising by value the assets transferred and the subsequent above or below the line expenditure; and giving details of the import duties accruing from each territory and the territorial give and take of income tax.



# Parliament and the Colonies

**Hola Deaths.** Sir Frank Soskice moved the Opposition motion deploring the deaths of eleven men at Hola Detention Camp in Kenya and regretting the failure of the Government to set up a public enquiry. He was not concerned, he said, with the different accounts of what happened or with the failure of the Attorney-General of Kenya to institute criminal proceedings. He was concerned to prove the Cowan Plan 'lunatic in conception' and wholly illegal and to lay the responsibility for the deaths where it belonged, with the prison administration, with the Minister of Defence, with the Kenya Government and with the Secretary of State.

In reply, Mr. Lennox-Boyd described the rehabilitation policy in Kenya and maintained that risks were inevitable. He argued that it was not the Cowan Plan which was at fault but the way in which it was executed. He admitted that the Prison Commandant, Mr. Sullivan, should have had a copy of the Cowan Plan and that the press statement issued after the deaths was 'a very unfortunate one' but refused to comment on the main part of the Opposition case as he said the matter was *sub judice*.

Mr. Callaghan, summing up for the Opposition, said that if the Government had accepted in February the Opposition motion calling for an enquiry into Kenya prisons the tragedy would never have occurred. He accused the Government and back benchers of conniving in the deaths at Hola and called on the Colonial Secretary to resign. For the Government Sir Reginald Manningham-Buller (in a speech which was continually interrupted) maintained that no criminal prosecution could properly be brought and that no useful purpose would be served by an enquiry. If fresh evidence came to light, he said, the matter would be reconsidered. The motion was defeated by 255 to 314. (June 16.)

**Detention of Nyasaland Congress Leaders.** Mr. Brockway asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies to what extent he had authorised the announcement by the Government of Nyasaland which stated that the leaders of the African National Congress would be detained for a long period and invited Africans to provide information about any unarrested members of the Congress. Mr. Julian Amery (Under-Secretary of State) replied that the Governor had not been obliged to consult the Secretary of State on this matter and had not done so, but that he had his support. The continuation of detention had been clearly stated to be related to the need to prevent a further threat to the peace of the territory. Mr. Brockway asked if this was not an invitation to Africans to become informers against fellow Africans and did the Under-Secretary think that this action should have been taken before the Devlin Commission had issued its report on the situation in Nyasaland. Mr. Amery repeated that the Colonial Secretary supported the Governor's action. Mr. Gaitskell asked if this was not a really

extraordinary situation that the government should appoint a Commission to investigate the truth or falsity of charges accusing certain leaders of the Congress of incitement to murder and that before the Commission had reported the Governor should announce that, whatever the findings of the Commission, those men were to be kept in detention. Was the Under-Secretary really defending that point of view and, if so, what was the purpose of sending out the Devlin Commission at all? Mr. Amery replied that Mr. Gaitskell had characteristically misrepresented what the Governor had said. Mr. Gaitskell asked if those people would be kept in detention, whatever the report of the Commission, or whether the decision would be dependent on that report. Mr. Amery asked Mr. Gaitskell to await the report of the Commission, but Mr. Gaitskell replied that he could not allow him to evade this question: on what grounds were the Government supporting the announcement that those people would in any case be kept in detention and how did he relate that to the appointment of the Devlin Commission? Mr. Amery replied that Mr. Gaitskell was making a purely hypothetical assumption about what the report of the Devlin Commission was likely to be. (June 4.)

**Tanganyika.** In an adjournment debate Mr. Arthur Skeffington said that the economy of Tanganyika had expanded greatly between 1947 and 1957. The situation had changed since then and in the current financial year there was a deficit of more than £1m. between revenue and expenditure, but he thought that the authorities had perhaps been too pessimistic in their forecast. In discussing steps to stimulate production Mr. Skeffington referred to the co-operative movement. There were 470 co-operative societies in Tanganyika, with more than 300,000 registered members. Share capital and reserves were over £2m. In 1957 no less than one-fifth of exports had been through the agency of the co-operative movement. A Co-operative Union was now called for so that the societies could have not only a common policy and common representation in meeting the Governor but could take their part with the co-operative movement in the rest of the world. He hoped that the threatened deficiency of £1m. in the revenue would not result in a series of panic measures. Any general setback in social services would be the worst possible action at this stage when so many developments were favourable to the future of Tanganyika.

Mr. Julian Amery said in reply that at the present time there were 546 co-operative societies, with a membership of 319,000. He also referred to the need to bring forward local people to fill higher posts in government, commerce and industry. Out of 27,962 government officers 24,606 were already domiciled. And whereas in 1954 five Africans had held senior appointments, now there were 181. (June 2.)



# Guide to Books . . .

## The Commonwealth in the World

By J. D. B. Miller. (Duckworth, 25s.)

This is a serious and important study of the Commonwealth. Professor Miller easily achieves the first desideratum for a proper analysis of the Commonwealth—namely that he gets outside an attachment to any particular member nation, yet remains emotionally within the Commonwealth. Failure to attain this kind of affiliated detachment vitiates many books on the Commonwealth. Professor Miller has the advantage of being an Australian who has taken roots in Britain: his resultant bifocal view of the Commonwealth has been of great use to him in his professional researches into the nature and problems of the Commonwealth.

The second desideratum for a serious study of the Commonwealth cannot be altogether satisfactorily solved—to find a method of approach that encompasses both the diversity and unity of the Commonwealth. Many books on the Commonwealth are little better than a disconnected series of accounts of its various member nations; others are too often a semi-mystical affirmation of the integrity of the Commonwealth, usually based on false analogies of blood-kinship.

Professor Miller's book avoids these pitfalls. After a brief historical sketch of the history of the evolution of the Commonwealth, which is well, if somewhat sketchily, done—he proceeds to analyse the national interests of each member in turn. He finds that in different ways and degrees each of these separate national interests includes a relationship to the Commonwealth.

This is an original and fruitful approach, because it presents the Commonwealth as an association—a 'concert of convenience' he calls it—that arises out of the varying interests of the actual members.

This approach to the nature of the Commonwealth is the more convincing because it is cast in a somewhat sceptical minor key, the portraits of the member nations are hardly flattering and their interests in the maintenance of the Commonwealth anything but ideal. Professor Miller sets out in a penetrating and unusual way some of the reasons why the various members remain in it. For Canada, the Commonwealth is crucial partly because it helps to maintain her distinct identity against the United States, partly because it enables her to prevent Britain from sacrificing Canadian interests in her own dealings with the United States. For India the Commonwealth has been of value in helping her to carry out her diplomacy. Because of the Commonwealth, Ceylon can cut a bigger figure in the world, and Ghana can maintain useful relations with South Africa which would otherwise be embarrassing. The Commonwealth helps the United Kingdom to preserve a greater status in the world. 'The Commonwealth is such a mystery to other countries that British governments can often imply more unity of policy between themselves and other members than exists in fact.'

This book represents what can be called a snapshot view of the Commonwealth; the reality of the Commonwealth is caught in an instant of time in actual and existing terms.

This is a useful way of looking at the Commonwealth; but, like any other method of analysis, it has its corresponding defects. For one thing, it will inevitably date: indeed in some respects it is already out of date. This particular defect could be remedied by a similar snapshot view at intervals of, say, ten years. I hope Professor Miller will accept this consequence of his treatment of the Commonwealth and himself provide us with further snapshots.

There is, however, a graver defect that is inherent in catching a living thing in a momentary stance. The author's picture is too sceptical and limited. The Commonwealth is shown as surviving primarily because its members desire certain economic advantages and because they have a degree of 'negative agreement' in international affairs. Broadly speaking, its members remain in the Commonwealth because none has any particular reason to leave it.

All this is true: indeed I quarrel with nothing that Professor Miller says and find many of his insights stimulating. I wholly agree with his dismissal of the ideas of a two-tier or of an 'expanding' Commonwealth. (In support of his views on the latter point he prays in aid my chapter in the *Fabian International Essays*.)

Nevertheless, for me the Commonwealth is something more exciting than Professor Miller's picture of it. The Commonwealth is more of a 'natural unit' than can appear from the method of approach used in this book. An attempt to analyse the evolution of the Commonwealth as a whole would reveal deeper affinities between the members and a more positive concept of Commonwealth. An inkling of this emerges from the earlier chapters which do trace the evolution of the 'natural unit' of the Commonwealth.

But this is only to say that there is a number of ways of approaching the unique character of the Commonwealth, each of which has its advantages and defects.

Professor Miller's book is certainly one that must be welcomed, and should be ready by everyone with a serious interest in the Commonwealth.

P. C. Gordon-Walker

## The Church of Scotland : Report on Central Africa

(William Blackwood and Sons. 9d.)

### Why Not Be Fair ?

Comments by Sir Gilbert Rennie on the Church of Scotland's Report (Obtainable from Rhodesia House).

Sir Roy Welensky, with his boxer's instinct, has always been quick to reply to criticism. The challenge set by the Church of Scotland could not be ignored: particularly as Dr. George Macleod was submitting to the vote of the General Assembly a report which said that the 1960 constitutional con-



ference 'should include a fearless examination of the possibility of the refashioning of the present Federal structure'.

In order to parry this blow Sir Roy instructed his High Commissioner in London to answer the Report in detail. This Sir Gilbert Rennie, himself an Elder of the Kirk, has done as well as anyone could who was determined not to yield a point; but there are one or two appalling lapses which give Mr. Chiume, Dr. Banda's lieutenant-in-exile, grounds for saying that Sir Gilbert has done the Congress cause more good in the space of 40 pages than anyone else could have done.

His style is of a dignified, precise and misunderstood administrator. Why did it have so little effect on the General Assembly? Was it that they were completely unimpressed by the Federal Government case of 'economic benefits' and gradual, well-considered political advancement; or that they felt these points were utterly irrelevant to the present explosive situation in Nyasaland? It is almost certainly the latter reason which moved them.

After all, we went through this last year when the Blantyre Synod stated that 'Federation . . . has produced a deep and widespread feeling of unrest which is like a poison among the people', and three white settler leaders bought a page in the *Nyasaland Times* to reply. The two sides were just not speaking the same language: the settlers said that the Africans were wrong-headed in being suspicious of Federation, while the African-dominated Synod said that what was important was not necessarily the facts, but what Africans believed were the facts; all else was irrelevant, until such beliefs were altered.

The argument has progressed little further than before, though Sir Gilbert with his page-by-page criticism of the Report is trying to alter beliefs. He scores points in correcting a few facts (though often irrelevant ones), but he makes three thundering mistakes. His counter-argument that African advancement has not come quickly enough because some nationalist leaders now prefer the prospect of African domination to partnership begs the question: the initiative was with the Europeans to prepare the ground for partnership. Secondly, to describe the Synod statement as 'deceitful' is self-deluding. It was an honest insight into African fears and the Government should be grateful. Worst

of all, to coin the phrase 'protective discrimination' (of the Africans) to justify the whole machinery of Southern Rhodesian segregation laws is either so naive or so cynical that Mr. Chiume is right to be pleased with this publication.

*Clyde Sanger*

## APPEAL

An urgent appeal has been received from Guy Clutton-Brock for the Southern Rhodesian Detainees Legal Aid and Welfare Fund of which he is the Chairman. The Fund has been set up to provide legal aid for the hundred men and one woman imprisoned without trial in Southern Rhodesia. They are held under the Preventive Detention (Temporary Provision) Act, 1959. This makes possible prolonged detention without trial and excuses the Government from the necessity of framing specific charges before a court of law. The proceedings of the Tribunal have started and each detained person will shortly appear before it. None of them has the means at his disposal to employ an advocate, and many of their wives and dependants are living on the small allowance provided by the Government for their maintenance only. It is estimated that a minimum sum of £2,500 will be required for legal aid. Donations should be sent either to: Mr. Guy Clutton-Brock, P.O. Box 2097, Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, or to the Africa Bureau, 65, Denison House, London, S.W.1.

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